Logical Notation and Everyday Language: Salvaging the Conception of Logic

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In *Philosophical Investigations* (hereafter, *PI*), Wittgenstein seemed to see in "logic" something an origin of our fallacy. This can be found in various passages in *PI*. "The sentence and the word that logic deals with are supposed to be something pure and clear-cut" (*PI* 105). "(T)he conflict between it [actual language] and our requirement", i.e. "the crystalline purity of logic", becomes the greater (*PI* 107). "The *preconception* of crystalline purity" (*PI* 108, italic is original) is a hindrance to grasp our ordinary language and linguistic activities. (Cf. *PI* 89, 97)

However, it does not seem that the conception of "logic" should be abandoned altogether. Rather, the problem would be our way of treating "logic" as being out of reality. We have "a tendency to sublimate the logic of our language" (*PI* 38). "(W)e're tempted to misunderstand the logic of our expressions here, to give an incorrect account of the use of our words." (*PI* 345). In *PI*, Wittgenstein tries to draw our attention to ourselves who are apt to consider "logic" to be "ideal" (*PI* 81).

The aim of the later Wittgenstein's philosophy would not be to prohibit using the word "logic", but to examine our way of treating the word. I would like to state that we had better focus on logical notation to achieve the aim. Our "preconception" (*PI* 108) of logic will be disappeared when logical notation employed in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* can be dissolve into our everyday language. On my presentation, I will demonstrate how to realize this way of philosophical activities.